Clean Water Advocacy - Newsroom - October 10, 2001 Testimony
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Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies |
TESTIMONY OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE AGENCIES (AMSA)
October 10, 2001
on
TERRORISM: ARE AMERICA’S WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT AT RISK?
Presented by
PATRICK T. KARNEY, P.E., DEE
Director
Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio
Submitted to
The
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1816 Jefferson Place, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2505
202.833.AMSA
202.833.4657 Fax
info@amsa-cleanwater.org
Testimony of Patrick T. Karney
Director, Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati
on behalf of the
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Duncan, Representative DeFazio and members of the
Subcommittee, my name is Pat Karney. I am Director of the Metropolitan Sewer District
(MSD) of Greater Cincinnati and serve as a member of the Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) Wastewater Infrastructure Security Task Force. MSD employs
650 environmental professionals who serve 800,000 users in Hamilton County. AMSA
represents the interests of more than 260 publicly owned treatment works (POTWs). AMSA's
members treat 18 billion gallons of wastewater every day and provide service to the
majority of the United States' sewered population.
On behalf of AMSA and the Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati, thank you for your support of the wastewater community by calling today’s hearing and inviting us to testify on infrastructure security.
To answer the question posed by the title of this hearingyes, America’s wastewater utilities, water resources and the environment are at risk from future terrorist attacks. The events of the past month have revealed how little our industry knows about the unique risks posed by terrorist threats and how we can better prepare ourselves for an uncertain future. MSD has been reviewing and strengthening the effectiveness of its security procedures over the past two years. We now realize that we will have to plan for the unimaginable if we are to fully protect the city’s citizens, MSD employees and our public assets from a broader, and more serious, array of risks. Perhaps most disturbing to the majority of public wastewater utility managers is the scarcity of resources to assist us in conducting vulnerability assessments and the rarity of security expertise in the wastewater infrastructure sector.
Mr. Chairman, I will begin my testimony with a review of how Cincinnati conducted readiness exercises prior to September 11, followed by a brief look at our response since the terrorist attack on our country. I will close my remarks with an overview of what AMSA is doing to assist the wastewater treatment industry to prepare for the future.
Review of MSD Preparedness
Cincinnati officials felt they were well prepared for an emergency following the
completion of two annual exercises focused on weapons of mass destruction, which was
funded, in part, by the federal government. Our first responders spent several days in
training and in practice drills during each week’s program. To conclude the week,
city department heads along with hospital, military, law enforcement (local, state and the
FBI), FEMA (state and federal), and associated volunteer organization personnel
participated in a daylong tabletop scenario. The first year we participated in the
exercise revealed a lack of coordination between agencies and, in many cases, a complete
ignorance as to which agencies participate in preparedness, response and recovery from
disasters. Most of the deficiencies were addressed through personal interaction between
the participants before the session ended. The second year helped to focus us on enhancing
our communications and coordination of efforts.
The last of these annual events was a full-scale mock chemical attack, sniper and bomb-planting exercise conducted at MSD’s Mill Creek Water Reclamation Facility. Fire, police, SWAT, and medical first responders all were involved. The day included the set-up of a National Guard decontamination tent, and treatment of exposed "victims".
Cincinnati has long maintained its own Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the city. This center is wired for multiple phone and computer communications lines, and is equipped with emergency power backup in the event of a sustained power outage. The city manager activates the EOC in the event of an imminent emergency situation or in response to an incident such as the 1997 flooding of the Ohio River.
MSD historically has played a major role in chemical spill response and investigation, whether accidental or intentional in origin. This role has increased MSD’s visibility and the frequency of communications with emergency and law enforcement personnel. I am proud of the respect given to us by local fire, police, and HAZMAT agencies, as well as by state and federal law enforcement officials. In addition to the recognition that MSD receives as an organization, two of the District’s Division of Industrial Waste supervisors received award citations from Ohio’s 25th Annual Inland Spills Conference this past month. MSD has gained valuable experience in prevention, investigation, and cleanup through its participation in these successful joint operations.
MSD’s recently-formed Security Task Force has included the following incidents on a list of major security threats: violence in the workplace, civil unrest, service interruption to associated utilities and infrastructure, vandalism, theft, irate customers, weather related emergencies and terrorist attacks. Aside from physical plant damage, these threats can cause a disruption of operations and service at the water reclamation facilities, pump stations, service garages and with the underground collection system. Cyber interference could affect MSD’s computers, management information, and customer service systems. The loss of electricity or natural gas supplies would adversely impact our service delivery. The Task Force also discussed the use of the physical facilities and collection system for negative purposes. On September 10, we were reasonably comfortable with the level of our knowledge and secure in our readiness and response capabilities.
MSD’s Response Since September 11
As with all City of Cincinnati government departments, MSD went into an immediate
"lock down" condition before noon on September 11th. We doubled
security personnel at all staffed facilities throughout the County. All persons passing
through our gates were questioned and had to state the purpose for their presence at the
facility. This information was recorded. These heightened security conditions remain in
effect today.
We also have changed our procedures for the swipe-card locks on all exterior-building doors. They no longer are turned off during the workday but remain in an active mode. Perimeter security has been tightened, with some "hardening" of access points now in effect. We immediately reviewed all process controls and chemical feed systems to ensure their safety and eliminate any possible risks, including the removal of some chemicals from various MSD sites.
An advisory was issued to all MSD environmental professionals regarding our heightened state of awareness, and requested their cooperation during this time of shifting procedures and other changes. MSD employees have accepted these changes readily and have made a few of their own by decorating every one of our facilities with numerous small American flags and red, white and blue decorations. We have changed the way we conduct our business, and will continually add new security and process measures as we gain the knowledge to identify additional risks and weaknesses. MSD’s preparedness has provided Cincinnati with more experience perhaps, than other wastewater utilities, but we still have a lot to learn.
AMSA Prepares to Help POTWs
Nationwide AMSA members comply with federal, state and local regulations that
require the development of safety, health and emergency preparedness plans in response to
chemical spills, natural disasters and other emergencies. Now, however, wastewater
utilities need to perform comprehensive vulnerability assessments and prepare emergency
response and recovery plans in response to potential terrorist activities. As you know,
the water supply sector was included as critical infrastructure under the May 1998
Presidential Decision Directive 63. Our colleagues in the drinking water sector have been
engaged since then in a variety of information sharing and risk identification programs to
help ensure the safety of the public drinking water supply. Until about a month ago,
wastewater treatment plants and collection systems were viewed merely as a subcategory of
water supply, and received little attention as security threats were assessed. Today, law
enforcement agencies, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and others clearly
consider wastewater treatment plants and collection systems as possible targets for
terrorist activities.
Immediately following the events of September 11, AMSA’s Board of Directors took decisive action to support wastewater utilities nationwide as they strengthened their systems against terrorist threats. An AMSA Wastewater Infrastructure Security Task Force was formed; funds were allocated to immediately begin exploration of publicly owned treatment works (POTW) security needs and to identify tools and initiatives to support enhanced security; the Association established itself as a link between the FBI and its members for the distribution of advisories; and, Managing & Protecting Water Infrastructure Assets was identified as the theme for AMSA’s February 2002 conference.
Our efforts have also included outreach to the U.S. EPA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Infrastructure Protection Center in an effort to pinpoint programs or experts in the area of wastewater infrastructure security.
In the short-term we plan to develop a wastewater utility "checklist," directing attention to key areas of concern and vulnerability. We have also identified the need for an industry-specific, asset-focused, risk-based, self-assessment tool with the goal of fully protecting the assets of the nation’s wastewater utilities. Once vulnerabilities are assessed, our efforts and resources must be expeditiously focused on upgrading and enhancing wastewater infrastructure security – as well as ensuring continuity of service.
Such essential undertakings to ensure the security of our nation’s aging infrastructure will clearly require federal support.
As the sole representative of public wastewater treatment agencies, AMSA is uniquely qualified to gather information, communicate with the industry, and develop the necessary materials, programs and initiatives to support POTWs across the country. AMSA and its members will need your help to secure our future and protect not only our infrastructure assets, but also public safety, public health and our environment.
Mr. Chairman, AMSA looks forward to working with you and the Subcommittee to address this important need. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to answer any questions.